P. Milne Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
This article begins by outlining some of the history - beginning with brief remarks of Quine's - of work on conditional assertions and conditional events. The upshot of the historical narrative is that diverse works from various starting points have circled around a nexus of ideas without convincingly tying them together. Section 3 shows how ideas contained in a neglected article of de Finetti's lead to a unified treatment of the topics based on the identification of conditional events as the objects of conditional bets. The penultimate section explores some of the consequences of the resulting logic of conditional events while the last defends it.
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